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Terrorism as a form of Imperialism:  
A Case for the Rule of Law 
Brian Kimari*
Abstract
The war on terror is indeed justified. Terror attacks have resulted in the deaths 
of many innocent people around the world. Every nation in fact has a duty to 
protect her citizens from terror attacks and put up measures to prevent and pun-
ish terrorists. However, the government also has a duty to uphold the rule of law 
at all times despite the gravity of the attacks. This paper disputes arguments that 
terrorism is so novel and so grave that the rule of law can be sacrificed in order to 
deal with it. This position fails since terrorism is not a novel challenge and further 
because terrorism manifests itself as a form of imperialism, which is a challenge 
that has several times been dealt with in world history. Terrorism does not change 
the normal rules of criminal procedure and thus the rule of law should not be 
suspended in the name of counter-terrorism.
I. Introduction
Recently, Kenya has withstood the worst of  terrorist attacks by the Al-
Shabaab militia group. The major attacks1 include the Westgate mall attack2 
* The author is a student at the Strathmore University Law School in Nairobi, Kenya.
1 Yongo differentiates between major and minor attacks through not only the way that public opinion 
has treated the attacks. He identifies the major terrorist attacks as follows: the 21st September 2013 
attack on the Westgate Mall, the 15th June 2014 attack in Mpeketoni, the 23rd November 2014 bus 
attack near Mandera, the 2nd December 2014 quarry attack in Koromey, Mandera and the 2nd April 
2015 attack on Garissa University College, Garissa.
 See Cecil Yongo, ‘The temptation of  power in the war against terrorism’ Strathmore Annual Law 
Conference, Nairobi, (4th August 2015), 4, 7. 
2 Kenya National Assembly, Report of  the Joint Committee on Administration and National
 Security, Defence and Foreign Relations on the inquiry into the Westgate terrorist attack, and other terror attacks 
in Mandera (Northeastern) and Kilifi (Coastal), Nairobi, Kenya National Assembly, 11th Parliament, 1st 
Session, December 2013.
 See also ‘Westgate mall attacks’ The Guardian, 21 September 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/
world/westgate-mall-attacks on 16th August 2015.
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where Al-Shabaab militants attacked a mall in Nairobi claiming the lives of  sixty 
five civilians and injured seventy five,3 the Garissa University attack where Al-
Shabaab militants claimed the lives of  at least one hundred and forty seven civil-
ians- mostly students of  the university, and injured at least eighty one, and the 
Mpeketoni attack4 on June 15th 2014.
These and other attacks have had economic, social, and political effects 
on Kenya and its people(s). The cost of  the war on terror has been costly and 
has had significant economic implications.5 Both the 2014/2015 budget6 and 
2015/2016 budget7 prioritised tackling insecurity.
Terrorism has also had social effects in Kenya with numerous reports of  
human rights violations. For instance, the ‘Operation Usalama Watch’ was ques-
tioned for its discriminatory and profiling nature and human rights violations,8 
with some wondering how the two approaches would ‘suddenly’ make Kenya a 
3 ‘Kenyan mall attacked by gunmen: 67 people reported dead’ WABC TV News, 21 September 2013. 
http://7online.com/ on 1 August 2015. 
 Gartenstein-Ross D and Appel H, ‘Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in Somalia: A databased snapshot’ 
Georgetown Journal of  International Affairs, 3 April 2014 http://journal.georgetown.edu/2014/04/03/
al-shabaabs-insurgency-in-somalia-a-data-based-snapshot-bydaveed-gartenstein-ross-henry-appel/ 
on 16th July 2015.
4 ‘Mpeketoni attacks death toll rises to 48’ The Daily Nation, 16 June 2014 http://www.nation.co.ke/
news/mpeketoni-Lamu-gunfire-al-shabaab-terrorism/-/1056/2349860/-/yf5qvgz/-/ on 21 July 
2015.
5 Operation Linda Nchi is estimated to have cost the government at least Ksh. 210 million per month 
in 2011. See ‘Kenya shifts cost of  Somalia war to the United Nations,’ Business Daily, 7 December 
2011.
 http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Kenya-shifts-cost-of-Somalia-war-to-the-
United-Nations-/-/539550/1285812/-/4wkycg/-/index.html on 10 December 2015.
6 The Treasury allocated Ksh 66.2 billion for the National Police Service, Ksh. 71.3 billion for Kenya 
Defence Forces and Ksh17.4 billion for National Security Intelligence.
 See ‘Which sectors bagged larger share of  Kenya’s trillion budget’ Awake Africa, June 13 2014 http://
awakeafrica.org/which-sectors-bagged-larger-share-of-kenyas-trillion-budget/ on 5 September 2015. 
7 Sh 223bn for security services (an increase of  Sh27bn) Sh 112.5bn for military security and Sh102bn 
for internal security. This includes Sh 25bn allocated to security modernisation (police and military), 
Sh. 6.4bn for AMISOM, and Sh. 7.7bn for leasing vehicles.
 See ‘Budget analysis: Some 34 items included in 2015/16 budget that affects you’ Kenya Today, 2015 
http://www.kenya-today.com/business/budget-analysis-34-items-included-201516-budget-affects 
on 5 September 2015.
 See also Parliamentary Budget Office, Unpacking the budget policy statement, 2015/16, and the Medium 
Term, 2015.
8 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015: Events of  2014, 2015, 331.
 It is reported that during Operation Usalama Watch in Nairobi and Mombasa in April, security 
officers from multiple agencies raided homes, buildings, and shops, carting away money, cell phones, 
and other goods. They harassed and detained thousands— including journalists, refugees, Kenyan 
citizens, and international aid workers—without charge, and in appalling conditions for periods well 
beyond the 24-hour legal limit.
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more secure country.9 Further, there have been reports of  arbitrary detention,10 
torture, disappearance, and extra-judicial killings of  terrorism suspects, Somali 
refugees and other people of  Somali origin by security forces.11 Treatment of  
this sort risks alienating Somalis and may lead to resentment for the Kenyan 
government and its security forces, which may in turncontribute to the risk of  
recruitment into Al-Shabaab and an increase in the number of  Al-Shabaab sym-
pathisers because of  such resentment.12
The manner in which the security agencies have carried out the war on 
terror in Kenya is bound to have political effects. The targeting of  the Somali 
Community,13 for instance, is bound to have political effects due to the large 
number of  Kenyan Somalis14 and Somali refugees15 living in Kenya. Kenya’s at-
tempts to create a buffer zone between the border and Somalia privileges the 
Ogaden community, who form the majority in Kenya, and this might create ten-
sion between the Ogaden and the minorities such as the Ajuran and Degodia.16 
The insecurity issue in Kenya seems to have been further politicised as can be 
seen through its use in rallying for political support.17 It has further been a key 
point behind the proposed constitutional amendment of  201518 where the op-
9 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Operation Usalama Watch; Too little too late, 16 May 
2014. http://www.knchr.org/OperationUsalamaWatchToolittletoolate.aspx on 1 September 2015.
10 Human Rights Watch, Kenya: Security forces arbitrarily detaining people, 2011.
 www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/28/kenya-security-forces-arbitrarily-detaining-people on 1 September 
2015.
11 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015: Events of  2014, 333.
12 ‘Somalia, Kenya risks death by a thousand cuts’, NDU Press, PRISM 3(3), 2012. http://www.ndu.
edu/press/somalia-kenyarisks-death.html on 1 September 2015.
13 The late Former Deputy Defence Minister, Orwa Ojode, was captured saying that the Al- Shabaab 
is a snake with its head in Eastleigh and its tail in Somalia. Eastleigh was clearly a target due to the 
large Somali population.
 See ‘War fears: Somalis in Kenya afraid of  xenophobia’ Associated Press, 11 November 2011.
 http://www.boston.com/news/world/africa/Articles/2011/11/11/war_fears_somalis_in_kenya_
afraid_of_xenophobia_1321030186/ on 10 December 2015. 
14 As of  2009, there were nearly 2.4 million Kenyan Somalis
 See Kenya National Bureau of  Statistics, 2009 Population and housing census results, 31 August 2010, 
www.knbs.or.ke on 23 July 2015. 
15 As of  2009, there were almost 500, 000 Somali Refugees.
 See UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2012 UNHCR country operations profile – Kenya, 2012 www.
unhcr.org on 26 July 2015. 
16 Crisis Group Africa Report N°184, The Kenyan military intervention in Somalia, 15 February 2012, 13.
17 IPSOS, ‘The big divide over Operation Linda Nchi’, 1 November 2014.
 http://www.ipsos.co.ke/NEWBASE_EXPORTS/Political%20Parties/141101_The%20Star%20
Siasa%20Mag._3_896dd.pdf  on 5 September 2015. 
18 See Article 24, Constitution of  Kenya, (2010). 
 https://odmyouthreloaded20172018.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/the-okoa-kenya-Constitutional-
amendment-bill-1.pdf  on 5 September 2015. 
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position leader Raila Odinga highlighted security as one of  the main sectors that 
require improvement. Adding to the political fold, following the attack in Lamu, 
President Uhuru Kenyatta expressed his concerns that the terrorist attacks were 
the product of  local politics.19 It was not clear whether the president directed the 
statement at the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) leader Raila 
Odinga, the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) attempts at secession or po-
litical squabbles in Lamu.20 What was clear, however, was that the Al-Shabaab 
played a role in the attack21 and that the political divide in Kenya was a strong 
weapon for the Al-Shabaab.22
As illustrated above, terrorism is a major problem and no contrary inter-
pretation should be taken from this paper. The Kenyan government’s reaction 
to terrorism is indeed justified both externally and within its borders. However, 
such government action and reaction is only justifiable when done within the 
confines of  the rule of  law. This paper argues that despite the magnitude of  ter-
rorism, the government must still respect the rule of  law.
Critics of  the rule of  law argument, in relation to terrorism, say that ter-
rorism requires the suspension of  normal rules.23 Some argue that terrorism sus-
pects do not deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that a citizen going 
through the normal judicial process deserves.24 This paper seeks to refute such 
arguments by showing the importance of  the rule of  law.
Bremer argues that in spite of  the impressions that some people may have, 
terrorism is nothing new but has been around for centuries.25 Concurring with 
Bremer, this paper puts forward the idea that terrorism and challenges similar to 
terrorism are not new. ‘Challenges similar to terrorism’ refers specifically to ‘im-
19 ‘Uhuru blames massacre on tribalism, hate politics’ Daily Nation, 17 June 2014. http://www.nation.
co.ke/news/Uhuru-blames-massacre-on-tribalism–hatepolitics/-/1056/2352306/-/wyy1laz/-/
index.html on 11 September 2015.
20 ‘Mpeketoni attacks: four possibilities’ BBC News Online, 17 June 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-africa-27890084 on 7 September 2015.
21 ‘Westgate, Mpeketoni killings suspects held’ The Star, 29 July 2014. http://www.the-star.co.ke/
news/Article-180630/westgate-mpeketoni-killings-suspects-held on 7 September 2015.
22 ‘Militants’ firebomb campaign sows fear in Kenyan resorts’ The Guardian, 17 July 2014, http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/17/militants-firebomb-campaign-sows-fear-in-kenyan-resorts 
on 31 August 2015.
23 Dickinson L A, ‘Using legal process to fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, 
International Tribunals, and the Rule of  Law’ 75. California Law Review, (2002), 1415.
24 Richey W, ‘How long can Guantanamo prisoners be held?’ Christian Science Monitor, 9 April 2002. 1, 4.
25 Bremer L P, ‘Counterterrorism: Strategy and tactics’ committee on Foreign Relations, Tampa Florida, 1 
November 1987. (This address has been published by the Bureau of  Public Affairs, Department of  
State, as Current Policy No. 1023).
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perialism.’ This paper brings out terrorism as one of  the methods of  imperialism. 
The similarity between imperialism and terrorism is that they both intend 
to alter the status quo of  particular governments or states, the difference largely 
being in the method by which the change in status quo is approached. This iden-
tification is essential to the argument that since forms of  imperialism, especially 
military imperialism, has rules that must be adhered to such as the rules of  war 
and international rules governing state relations and domestic rules governing 
inter-state relations, states should likewise observe these rules when dealing with 
terrorism.
This paper will further emphasise the importance of  the rule of  law when 
dealing with terrorism, arguing that respecting the rule of  law may indeed be a 
more effective way of  dealing with the terrorist menace. Finally, the paper analy-
ses the measures that Kenya has taken in the fight against terrorism and proposes 
recommendations or reforms to ensure compliance with the rule of  law.
II. ‘Imperialism’ defined
The term ‘imperialism’ has been used to describe or explain varied actions 
and dispositions. For instance, other states viewed the British as imperialistic 
when they acquired colonies in Africa,26 the Soviet’s Union policy of  commu-
nism was viewed to be imperialistic,27 and so was Chinese industrial action in 
Africa.28 Moreover, others use the term ‘American imperialism’ in reference to 
some actions taken by the United States, whether in industry, military and even 
culture.29
The meaning of  the term is as clear as mud. It has been used as a tool 
against foreign policies, which are opposed by the user of  such a term, despite 
consideration of  the actual substance and intention of  the policy pursued.30 It is 
26 Cain P J and Hopkins A G, British Imperialism: Innovation and expansion 1688 – 1914, Longman 
Publishers, 2000.
 Lloyd T O, The British Empire, 1558-1995, Oxford University Press, edition 2, 1966.
27 Velyschenko S, Painting Imperialism and nationalism red: The Ukranian Marxist Critique of  Russian 
Communist Rule in Ukraine, 1918-1925, University of  Toronto Press, 3 September 2015. 
28 Hitchens P, ‘Africa’s last, worst hope: A continent that withstood European colonialism welcomes 
Chinese conquest’ The American Conservative Vol 7, No.23, 1 December 2008.
29 Field Jr. J A, ‘American imperialism: The worst chapter in almost any book’ The American Historical 
Review Vol. 83, No. 3, June 1978, 644-668.
30 Schumpeter J, The sociology of  imperialisms, as reprinted and translated in Imperialism and Social Classes, 
ed Hoselitz B, New York, Meridian Books, 1955, 11.
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captured as having been ‘applied only to the enemy, in a reproachful sense, being 
carefully avoided with reference to the speaker’s own policies.’31 Langer criticises 
‘imperialism’ as vague, arguing that its use may be extended to cover any form 
of  influence and thus proposes that we stick to a concept that is measurable and 
manageable.32
Despite these and other critiques, it would not be prudent to ignore it com-
pletely. Conflict and criticism may be avoidable if  the use of  the term is limited 
to a particular definition, which will be the working definition of  the writer. As 
this paper intends on basing its argument on an imperialistic concept, it will rely 
on a working definition of  imperialism. 
Since this text focuses on the influence of  the relations of  foreign unwanted 
powers and the state, the definition will be only as is relevant to this discussion. It 
will thus not capture all relations of  international politics, facets of  colonialism,33 
neo-colonialism,34 theories of  imperialism by use of  great economic forces,35 
devil-theory of  imperialism36 or any other theory that falls outside the scope.37
My working definition of  imperialism is that it involves a policy devised to over-
throw the status quo of  the state, that is, a policy that intends to change the relationship between 
31 Schumpeter J, The sociology of  imperialisms. 11, 71. 
32 Langer W, ‘A critique of  Imperialism’ Foreign Affairs, xiv, 1935, 103.
33 Imperialism is viewed as a valid description of  any kind of  colonial expansion.
 See Moon P T, Imperialism and world politics New York, The Macmillan Company, 1926.
 See also Bourguiba H, ‘The outlook for Africa’, International Affairs, vol. 37, no. 4, 1961, 428.
34 Imperialism is seen as a relationship between the powerful and the powerless, which bestows upon 
the powerless material consequences and thus grant the powerful control.
 See Hourani A, ‘The decline of  the West in the Middle East’ International Affairs, xxix, 1953, 31. 
 See also Gandhi M, Young India1919-1922, Madras, 1922, 648.
35 Marxists posit that capitalism is the main evil and imperialism is only its necessary manifestation. 
 See Lenin, Collected Works, New York: International Publishers, Vol XVII, 1929.
 See also Lenin, Selected Works, New York: International Publishers, Vol V, 1935.
 See also Bukharin, Imperialism, the highest stage of  capitalism, New York: International Publishers, 1933, 
72. 
36 The devil theory views imperialism as a sort of  propaganda or conspiracy theory where such policies 
are seen as having been brought by capitalistic minds in order to obtain economic benefits and 
become wealthy.
 See Beard C, The Devil Theory of  War, New York: The Vanguard Press, 1936. 
37 A discussion on the different views on imperialism and the various critiques to such views is indeed 
interesting but is so wide that a completely different paper as a topic on its own would only best 
capture it. Such an extensive discussion is therefore not important to the idea of  this text. 
 Find a more comprehensive discussion on these matters in Thornton AP, Doctrines of  Imperialism, John Wiley 
and Sons Inc., 1965, 1 – 46. 
 See also Morgenthau H, Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace, McGraw Hill Inc., Kenneth 
W Thompson ed, 1993, 57 – 65.
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the rulers and the ruled such that rule of  the government of  the day is replaced by rule of  the 
designer of  the imperialist policy.38
III. Methods of imperialism
Imperialists have typically employed three methods to achieve their impe-
rialistic objectives. These are military imperialism, cultural imperialism and economic 
imperialism.
i. Military imperialism
This kind achieves the goals of  imperialism through military conquest. 
There is an overthrow of  the status quo such that the imperialist displaces the 
rulers from their positions and takes over control of  the territories. This is in 
contrast to economic and cultural forms where imperialism occurs despite rule 
by the pre-existing instruments of  governance.
Several examples of  this form of  imperialism are seen through the ages, 
through actual occupation of  a territory by another nation or a belligerent gov-
ernment. Military imperialism is understandably more effective since the success 
of  military conquest usually results in immediate victory and allows immedi-
ate achievement of  the imperialistic goal.39 This method, however, carries the 
greatest risk since should the imperialist be defeated by the holding military, the 
imperialistic goal is quickly thwarted and further risks occupation by the holding 
military in countering the imperialist themselves.
38 This definition is based on what I think is the ultimate goal of  imperialism which is the domination 
of  those against whom imperialist policy is exercised. Notice that the working definition used does 
not look at the specific method employed or the content of  the said imperialistic policy. This is 
simply in order to remain objective and allow a policy that is supposedly imperialistic to be judged in 
by the goals of  that policy such that it is imperialistic if  it intends to overthrow the government and 
dominate the people. This is as opposed to giving policies considered to be imperialistic and labelling 
any similar policies as such.
39 He explains that had Napoleon I used military conquest as opposed to or in addition to using the 
ideologies of  the French Revolution, he would have been able to achieve his imperialistic goals over 
Europe much faster.
 Morgenthau H, Politics among nations, 70.
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ii. Economic Imperialism
Economic imperialism aims to change the power relations through eco-
nomic control, rather than exacting control on the actual territory.40
There are examples of  organized or stronger entities conquering or at-
tempting to conquer weaker or less organized entities for economic ends. For 
instance, during the scramble and partition of  Africa, the more organised Euro-
pean nations sought to acquire colonies or occupy territories in Africa largely for 
economic purposes.41 These states sought to redirect pressure on the resources 
at home. The idea was simple: acquire resources from Africa and use them at 
home.42
Though the colonial powers saw strategic, dynastic, and sentimental reasons 
for acquiring colonies,43 the economic advantage of  colonialism was as a more 
direct goal of  colonialist policies.44 Sir Frederick Lugard showed this particular 
goal of  imperialism in this statement: ‘I do not believe that in these days our 
national policy is based on motives of  philanthropy only.’45
iii. Cultural Imperialism
This form of  imperialism comprises all kinds of  intellectual influences, po-
litical and otherwise that serve as means for imperialistic ends. It aims at the 
control or possible manipulation of  the minds or thought process of  the people 
in order to change existing power relations. It is seen as a means through which 
weaker entities are attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shap-
ing their social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the values and 
structures of  the imperialistic or dominant actor.46 
In this, a culture is made to appear superior or an attractive political philos-
40 Morgenthau H, Politics among nations, 71.
41 Hobson J A, Imperialism: A study, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1903, 12.
42 Hobson J A, Imperialism: A study, 41.
43 Woolf  L, Empire and commerce in Africa: A study in economic imperialism, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1968.
44 Hobson suggests that the economic condition is the taproot of  imperialism. He explains that people 
would avoid imperialism were it not for the economic condition where countries constantly produce 
insufficient products in relation to the level of  consumption and thus there is need to acquire more 
resources in order to increase production.
 See Hobson J A, Imperialism: A study. Chapter VI, 71-92.
45 Lugard F, The rise of  our East African Empire, William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh, 1893, 379-382..
46 Schiller, H I, Communication and cultural domination, International Arts and Sciences Press, New York, 
1976.
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ophy is injected into the minds of  the people. It becomes so persuasive in their 
minds that it allows for the imperialist with a ‘superior’ culture or attractive politi-
cal philosophy to garner the support and admiration of  the people so that he can 
effectively take control of  them. This form of  imperialism appears legitimised 
since the minds of  the people are such that they have consented to this rule and 
shifted their support from the existing rulers to the imperialists.
Cultural imperialism is often used concurrently with economic and military 
imperialism. Its role is to garner the support of  the people using philosophies 
before employing military or economic imperialism forms. The effect is such that 
the ruled, and to an extent the rulers, become less opposed to other imperialistic 
tendencies.47
Despite sounding very abstract, this form of  imperialism has had numerous 
successes. Two examples of  such successes are the National Socialist philoso-
phies of  Germany before World War II and the Communist philosophies of  
the Soviet Union and China. The Nazi or National Socialist philosophies were 
particularly successful in Austria as can be evidenced by the invitation of  Ger-
many to occupy Austria in 1938 by the pro-National Socialist government. Most 
of  Eastern Europe was loyal to the Soviet Union due to their subscription to the 
Communist policies. This was so much so that Russia gained immense control 
during the Cold Wars.48These examples further show that cultural imperialism is 
often used to aid other forms of  imperialism. Germany, for instance, used the 
National Socialist policy in order to gain support of  the people to exact military 
control in Austria, which was instrumental to Hitler in World War II. The Soviet 
Union further used the Marxist and Leninist influence in Eastern Europe in or-
der to gain support of  the people allowing Russia to gain economic control of  
the Eastern European states. 
In modern times, many authors have identified the media as a tool of  cul-
tural imperialism where the ownership, structure, distribution, or content of  the 
media in any country are subjected to external pressures from the media interests 
of  any other country or countries, without proportionate reciprocation of  influ-
ence by the country so affected.49 Shriller further defines cultural imperialism 
as describing the situation where large multinational corporations, including the 
47 Morgenthau H, Politics among nations, 72.
48 Morgenthau H, Politics among nations, 73.
49 Boyd-Barrett, JO, ‘Media imperialism: Towards an international framework for an analysis of  media 
systems’, in eds Curran J, Gurevitch M, and Woollacott J, Mass communication and society, Edward 
Arnold, London, 1977, 116.
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media, of  developed countries dominated developing countries.50 Without as-
suming that the media is central to culture,51 the media does play an important 
role in the formation of  culture.52
IV. Objectives of Imperialism
Methods of  imperialism are not to be confused with the objectives of  im-
perialism. This means that despite military imperialism aiming to conquer mili-
tarily, economic imperialism aiming at economic exploitation, and cultural impe-
rialism aiming at cultural displacement, all imperialistic tendencies or forms have 
one goal, which is to overthrow the status quo.
In line with the definition herein, the ultimate objective of  imperialism is to 
change the relationship of  power between the rulers and the ruled such that rule of  the govern-
ment of  the day is replaced by the rule of  the designer of  imperialist policy.
V. Terrorism
i.	 ‘Terrorism’	Defined
In Kenya, the Prevention of  Terrorism Act53 defines terrorism as:
‘an activity carried out with the intent of  ‘intimidating or causing fear amongst mem-
bers of  the public or a section of  the public,’ ‘intimidating or compelling the Govern-
ment or international organisation to do, or refrain from any act,’ or ‘destabilizing the 
religious, political, constitutional, economic or social institutions of  a country, or an 
international organization.’
However, no definition of  terrorism has yet found universal acceptance. 
Several definitions have been offered, for instance by the UN General Assem-
bly54, UN Security Council55, The UN Convention for the Suppression of  the 
50 Schiller H I, Communication and cultural domination, International Arts and Sciences Press, New York, 
1976.
51 Tomlinson J, Cultural imperialism: A critical introduction, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
1991.
52 White LA, ‘Reconsidering cultural imperialism theory’ Florida State University, 2000. 
 http://tbsjournal.arabmediasociety.com/Archives/Spring01/white.html on 8 December 2015.
53 Article 2(b), Prevention of  Terrorism Act (Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 149 of  2012).
54 UNGA, Measures to eliminate international terrorism, UN A/Res/49/60, 9 December 1994.
55 UNSC S/RES/1566 (2004) Concerning Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by 
Terrorism.
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Financing of  Terrorism,56 the European Union,57 the United Kingdom,58 the 
United States,59 and the Arab Convention for the Suppression of  Terrorism.60
The lack of  a universally accepted definition of  terrorism is itself  inimical 
to the rule of  law since it allows for politicised use of  the law on terrorism, par-
tial compliance with UN resolutions aimed at counter-terrorism and inconsisten-
cies in counter-terrorism.61 Bassiouni, for instance, claims that the United States 
has consistently been opposed to a general definition of  terrorism so that it can 
pick and choose the disparate norms that it wishes to rely upon and because it 
does not want to have an effective multilateral scheme that would presumably 
restrict its unfettered political power to act unilaterally.62
It is therefore important that we adopt a general definition of  terrorism to 
streamline the fight against terrorism and thus ensure that states do not act in 
excess. This general definition of  terrorism should be arrived at by compiling all 
the shared characteristics of  terrorism as pointed out by states and international 
bodies in their own definitions. Despite the multiplicity and difference in the 
definitions offered above, all definitions seem to point to terrorism having four 
main characteristics: (1) the threat or use of  violence; (2) a political objective, 
which is, the desire to change the status quo; (3) the intention to spread fear by 
committing spectacular public acts, and (4) the intentional targeting of  civilians.63
VI. Terrorism as a form of Imperialism
Based on the characteristics of  terrorism, we see that terror attacks are 
designed or have a general aim to intimidate or compel the government or the 
population to adopt such conduct or action as will allow the terrorist to achieve 
his political or such other objective. Scholars have pointed to terrorism as politi-
56 Convention for the Suppression of  the Financing of  Terrorism, 9 December 1999, UN Doc 38349.http://
www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm on 23 Jan 2016.
57 Article 1, Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 13 June 2002, EU COE 2002/475/JHA. 
58 Article 1, The Terrorism Act (2000).
59 Section 2331, U.S Federal Criminal Code, (US Chapter 113(B)), Chapter 9, 37, U.S. Army Field Manual, 
14 June 2001, No. FM 3-0.
60 Arab convention for the suppression of  terrorism, 1998.
61 Peerenboom R, ‘Human rights and rule of  law: What’s the relationship?’ Research Paper No. 05-31. 
University of  California, Los Angeles School of  Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 127
62 Bassiouni, MC, ‘Legal control of  international terrorism: A policy-oriented assessment’, 43 Harvard 
International Law Journal, (2002), 83, 92.
63 Arizona Department of  Emergencies and Military Affairs, Various Definitions of  Terrorism. 
http://www.azdema.gov/museum/famousbattles/pdf/Terrorism%20Definitions%20072809.pdf  
on 23 January 2016.
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cal violence or the threat of  violence by groups or individuals who deliberately 
target civilians or non-combatants in order to influence the actions or behaviours 
of  targeted publics and governments.64
Such change in the conduct or action of  government or population is in-
dicative of  the control newly acquired by the imperialist actor. The control of  
the government through terrorism is telling of  a form of  imperialism. This is 
because (in line with the definition given) the terrorist has managed to change 
the status quo by changing the relationship of  power between the rulers and the 
ruled so that rule of  the government of  day is replaced by rule of  the terrorist. 
Terrorism is thus similar to military, economic, and cultural imperialism since 
they share an objective. 
As stated earlier, imperialism is classified into different forms by looking 
at the methods used in pursuit of  imperialism, i.e. economic – economic ex-
ploitation, military- military conquest, cultural – cultural displacement. Terror-
ism should thus be classified as another type of  imperialism due to the unique 
method used to achieve the imperialistic end.
Terrorism may appear to fall under military imperialism due to the use of  
actual force or violence to achieve its ends. This is not the case. Terrorism does 
not necessarily require violence to occur; the mere threat of  violence is sufficient 
to classify it as a terrorist act.65 What defines terrorism is exactly that – ‘terror.’ 
Terrorists use fear to gain control. 
Terrorists instil fear in the people such that they lose trust in the govern-
ment of  day to rule over them since they have been unable to protect them from 
those terrorist activities. As Nacos notes, central to terrorism is 
‘the desire to intimidate a targeted population, to spread fear, and undermine the de-
clared values of  the targeted political system by pushing a frightened society and gov-
ernment into overreaction.’66
Terrorism is thus a different form of  imperialism - Imperialism by Terror! 
64 Nacos B L, Terrorism and counterterrorism: Understanding threats and responses in the post-9/11 world, 2006, 
32. 
65 In Kenya, the crime is constituted without need to prove actual violence; mere threat is sufficient. 
Article 2(b), Prevention of  Terrorism Act (2012).
66 Bridgette L. Nacos, ‘Terrorism/counterterrorism and media in the age of  global communication’, 
United Nations University Global Seminar Second Shimame-Yamaguchi Session, “Terrorism—A Global 
Challenge”, (5-8 August 2006), 6.
 http://archive.unu.edu/gs/files/2006/shimane/Nacos_text_en.pdf  on 9 August 2015.
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VII. The Rule of Law
The importance of  the rule of  law needs no further accentuation. Finnis, 
for instance, finds that the rule of  law is ‘the name commonly given to the state 
of  affairs in which a legal system is legally in good shape’67 whereas Raz contends 
that rule of  law is a shorthand description of  the positive aspects of  any given 
political system.68 Importance can further be seen in the words of  John Locke 
who states that ‘Wherever the law ends, tyranny begins’69
Difficulty has, however, been found in describing this concept of  the rule 
of  law. While discussing the subject of  the rule of  law, one would certainly be 
remiss if  he failed to mention Dicey and his conception of  the rule of  law.70 He 
argued that the rule of  law had three conceptions: 1) no man can be lawfully 
punished except for a distinct breach of  law established in the ordinary legal 
manner before the ordinary courts of  the land; 2) every man, whatever be his 
rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of  the realm and amenable to 
the jurisdiction of  the ordinary tribunals; 3) rights such as the right to personal 
liberty, freedom from arrest etc. are drawn from judicial decisions in England 
rather than from constitutions.71
This paper will focus on the eight precepts of  the rule of  law as offered 
by Lord Tom Bingham.72 His rule of  law precepts shall form the foundation for 
analysis of  measures taken in dealing with terrorism to determine whether they 
have respected or violated the rule of  law. He identifies the fundamental precepts 
of  the rule of  law as follows:
‘1) The law must be accessible and intelligible; 2) disputes must be solved by application 
of  the law rather than the exercise of  discretion; 3) the law must apply equally to all; 
4) the law must protect fundamental human rights; 5) disputes must be solved without 
prohibitive cost or inordinate delay; 6) public officials must use power reasonably and 
not exceed their powers; 7) the system for resolving differences must be fair and; 8) a 
state must comply with its international law obligations.’73
67 Finnis J, Natural law and natural rights, Oxford, 1980, 270.
68 Raz J, ‘The rule of  law and its virtue’ in The Authority of  Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford, 
1979, 210.
69 Locke J, Second treatise of  Government, 1690, Chap XVII, s.202, Cambridge, 1988, 400. 
 See also Paine T, Common sense, London, 1994, 279.
70 Dicey A V, An introduction to the study of  the law of  the constitution, London, 1885 
71 Dicey A V, An introduction to the study of  the law of  the constitution, Part II.
72 Bingham T, ‘The Rule of  Law’, 66 Cambridge Law Journal 67, 2007, 69.
73 Bingham T, ‘The Rule of  Law’, 69. See also Wagstaff  R, Terror Detentions and the Rule of  Law: US and 
UK perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2014, 115.
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As Ambani argues, it is not difficult to identify traces of  the rule of  law in 
the Constitution of  Kenya, 2010.74 True to this, Bingham’s precepts of  the rule 
of  law can be identified in constitutional provisions. To begin with, ours is a writ-
ten constitution. Some argue that this will enable closer regulation of  political 
action because it prescribes more fundamental functions of  government than an 
unwritten constitution would.75 This is in line with Bingham’s first precept since 
a written constitution is more accessible and intelligible than an unwritten one. 
The second precept is seen through the provision that every person has the 
right to have any dispute that can be resolved by application of  the law decided 
in a fair and public hearing before a court.76
Article 2 resonates with Bingham’s third precept in its provision that ‘this 
constitution is the supreme law of  the Republic and binds all persons and all state 
organs at both levels of  government.’77 The fourth precept is further satisfied by 
the provisions in the Bill of  Rights, which guarantee protection of  life, equality, 
human dignity, freedom of  expression, freedom from discrimination and other 
essential rights.78
In line with the fifth precept, Article 50 protects the right of  the accused 
to have the trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay.79 The Consti-
tution also complies with Bingham’s sixth precept since according to Article 2, 
‘no person may claim or exercise state authority except as authorised under this 
Constitution.’80 This provision enables the constitution to check the powers of  
state authorities. The Constitution also promotes accountability of  authorities 
through its national values and principles of  good governance, integrity, trans-
parency and accountability.81
All accused persons are further afforded the right to fair trial82 in line with 
the seventh precept. The eighth precept is also complied with through Article 
2(5), which provides that the general rules of  international law shall form part of  
the laws of  Kenya. Article 2(6) is additional proof  of  Kenya’s intention to obey 
its international law obligations; it states that ‘any treaty or convention ratified by 
Kenya shall form part of  the law of  Kenya under this Constitution.’83
74 Mbondenyi M K and Ambani J O, The new Constitutional law of  Kenya, Law Africa, 2013, 53.
75 Jennings W I, The Law and the Constitution, University of  London Press, 5th ed, 1964, 51.
76 Article 50(1), The Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
77 Article 2(1), The Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
78 Chapter 4, The Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
79 Article 50(2) (e), The Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
80 Article 2(2), The Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
81 Article 10, The Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
82 Article 50(2), The Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
83 Article 2(5), Article 2(6) The Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
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The fact that the constitution provides for and affirms the rule of  law 
should be taken in consideration since it is the supreme law. No deviations and 
inconsistencies with the Constitution, including the rule of  law precepts, are 
allowed even when provided in other laws or practices.84 In the words of  Lord 
Bingham:
‘The statutory affirmation of  the rule of  law as an existing Constitutional principle and 
of  the Lord Chancellor’s existing role in relation to it does have an important conse-
quence: that the judges, in their role as journeymen and judgment-makers, are not free 
to dismiss the rule of  law as meaningless verbiage, the jurisprudential equivalent of  
motherhood and apple pie, even if  they were inclined to do so. They would be bound 
to construe a statute so that it did not infringe an existing Constitutional principle, if  it 
were reasonably possible to do so. And the Lord Chancellor’s conduct in relation to that 
principle would no doubt be susceptible, in principle, to judicial review.’85
VIII. Terrorism and the Rule of Law
Some argue that those who insist on the importance against the law in the 
fight for terrorism are at best naïve.86 To be clear, arguments on the rule of  law 
are indeed powerless to prevent terrorism. No law can single-handedly curb ter-
rorist activity. Laws can make terrorist action difficult, for instance, by freezing 
the accounts of  suspected terrorists. However, they cannot completely deter a 
terrorist from engaging in terrorist activity.87 What, then, is the importance of  
the rule of  law? 
The importance of  this section is not to romanticise the rule of  law but 
rather to show the benefits of  observance of  the rule of  law. This section at-
tempts to prove that respect for the rule of  law is instrumental to Kenya achiev-
ing its goal, which in this case is to win the fight against terrorism.
First, respect for the rule of  law is essential in order to preserve the democ-
racy that is Kenya. Democracy, rule of  law and individual freedoms are closely 
interlinked. Without individual freedom and the rule of  law, real democracy can-
not exist.88 The Kenyan Constitution provides for the Bill of  Rights, which en-
shrines some of  the fundamental rights that must be respected.89 Actions that are 
84 Article 2(4), The Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
85 Bingham T, ‘The Rule of  Law’, 69.
86 Wedgwood R, ‘The case for military tribunals’, Wall Street Journal, 3 December 2001, A18. 
87 Peerenboom R, ‘Human Rights and rule of  law’, 128.
88 Hostettler P, ‘Human Rights and the war against international terrorism’ in Terrorism and International 
Law: Challenges and Responses, ed Schmitt M and Beruto G L, 2002, 30-39.
89 Chapter 4, The Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
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in violation of  people’s rights place in jeopardy core procedural rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution and fundamental principles.90
In order to combat terrorism, the government and its security forces need 
to be perceived as complying with the rule of  law; fair procedures are important 
if  the aim is to deter future acts of  terrorism or at least to not inspire new ones.91 
When states violate human rights they surrender the moral high ground and their 
constitutional legal foundation; the human rights violations can be used by the 
media to demonstrate the ruthlessness of  a government, which may in turn in-
crease the number of  direct or indirect supporters of  terrorist organisations.92
Upholding existing norms regarding due process and civil liberties, even 
during a time of  crisis, will demonstrate commitment to rule of  law, serve an 
educative function in isolating terrorists and distinguish their unjust means from 
our just and venerable methods, while promoting the development of  laws and 
norms regarding terrorism.93 As was expressed by J. O’Connor in Hamdi v Rums-
field, it is during the most challenging and uncertain moments that a nation’s 
commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that 
we must preserve our commitment.94
Moreover, it is argued that counter-terrorism laws that threaten fundamen-
tal rights are likely to result in state terrorism95 in the form of  police violence, 
torture, sexual assault, and illegal arrest and detention based on ethnicity, race, 
religion or class background.96
Finally, counter-terrorism methods that violate the rule of  law are likely to 
result in more violence.97 In the words of  Farer, 
90 ‘To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of  lost liberty; my message is this: Your 
tactics only aid terrorists—for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve.’
 Attorney General John Ashcroft ‘Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending against Terrorism’ 
Hearing before the senate committee on the Judiciary, 107th Congress, 2001. http://www.senate.
gov/~judiciary/print_testimony.cfm?id=121&wit_id=42 on 8 December 2015.
91 Dickinson L A, ‘Using legal process to fight terrorism’, 1477.
92 Hostettler P, ‘Human Rights and the war against international terrorism.’
93 Peerenboom R, ‘Human rights and rule of  law’, 1435-67.
94 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (O’Connor, J.).
95 State terrorism refers to acts or threats to violence, by a state, towards foreigners or towards its own 
people that would ordinarily constitute terrorism. 
 See Primoratz I, ‘State terrorism and counter-terrorism’ Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, 
Working Paper Number 2002/3, 2002, 1-3.
96 Head M, ‘Counter-terrorism Laws Threaten Fundamental Democratic Rights’ 27(3) Alternative Law 
Journal, 2002, 125.
 See also McCulloch J, ‘War at Home: National Security Arrangements Post 11 September 2001’ 27(2) 
Alternative Law Journal, 2002, 90.
97 Quoting John F. Kennedy, ‘Those who make peaceful evolution impossible, make violent revolution 
inevitable.’ Bassiouni, M C, ‘Legal Control of  International Terrorism’, 103.
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“Once the frame of  order is broken, we can reasonably anticipate increasingly norm-
less violence, pitiless blows followed by monstrous retaliation in a descending spiral of  
hardly imaginable depths.”98
IX. Measures taken to curb Terrorism within Kenya’s borders99
i. The Anti-terrorism Police Unit (ATPU)
To handle terrorist threats, a Special Branch of  the police known as the 
Anti-terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) was created within the Criminal Investiga-
tions Department (CID) in 2003.100 The ATPU is funded by the United States 
of  America and the United Kingdom with the United States being rumoured to 
have funded $9 million101 (or is it $19 million?102) in Anti-terrorism assistance to 
Kenya in 2012 alone, part of  which went to training officers of  the ATPU. The 
ATPU has been credited with thwarting dozens of  other terrorist plots, the cap-
ture of  several terrorist suspects and the arrest or killing of  dozens of  terrorist 
suspects, in an ostensibly robust counterterrorism response.103
The ATPU has, however, been criticised for violations of  several human 
rights abuses. Several human rights activists have accused the ATPU of  using 
counter-terrorism measures to persecute the Kenyan Muslim community.104 The 
ATPU has been accused of  repeatedly acting against the rule of  law. These ac-
cusations include:
98 Farer T J, ‘Beyond the Charter frame: Unilateralism or condominium’, 96 American Journal of  
International Law (2002), 386.
99 The focus here shall only be on the government’s measures taken within Kenya. This means that 
this paper will not look into the actions of  the Kenyan Government and military forces in Somalia 
including any operations conducted by the KDF in conjunction with or as part of  the AMISOM 
mission in Somalia. Though such analysis should indeed be understood, it would be of  little relevance 
to the findings of  this paper. 
100 ‘Kenya: Killings, disappearances by Anti-Terror Police’, 18 August 2014. https://www.hrw.org/
news/2014/08/18/kenya-killings-disappearances-anti-terror-police on 25 July 2015. 
 This was in response to the attacks on the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998 and on an Israeli-owned 
Mombasa hotel in 2002.
101 ‘Kenya: Killings, disappearances by Anti-Terror Police’, 18 August 2014.
102 ‘Kenya anti-terror police accused of  killing suspects’ 18 August 2014. http://www.nation.co.ke/
news/Human-Rights-Watch-ATPU-killings-al-shabaab-terrorism/-/1056/2422670/-/jtq6y3z/-/
index.html on 21 July 2015. 
103 See MUHURI and Open Society Justice Initiative, We’re tired of  taking you to the Court: Human rights 
abuses by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, Open Society Foundations, New York, 2013. https://www.
opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/human-rights-abuses-by-kenya-atpu-20140220.pdf  
on 25 July 2015.
104 Ploch L, Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U. S. response, Congressional Research Service, 13 
November 2010, 37. See also, U. S Department of  State, International Freedom Report 2009, 6 October 
2009.
Brian Kimari
208 Strathmore Law Review, January 2016
ii. Arbitrary Arrest and Detention
The ATPU has conducted several raid and arrest operations where they 
have arbitrarily detained suspects. For instance, in 2012, the ATPU allegedly con-
ducted such an operation in Mombasa on November 13th and 14th when they 
arrested and detained at least 9 individuals.105 Several such detentions have been 
cited by the NGO, Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI).106
iii. Extra-judicial Killings or Assassinations
The ATPU has further been accused of  assassinations of  terrorist suspects 
such as Kassim Omollo,107 Kassim Mohammed Nero,108 Omar Faraj and Titus 
Nabiswa.109 It is also suspected that they played a part in the killings of  Sheikh 
Ibrahim Omar Rogo, Sheikh Aboud Rogo,110 and Samir Hashim Khan.111
iv. Extraordinary Renditions 
The ATPU has been accused of  unlawfully transferring suspects to Ethio-
pia, Uganda, Somalia and the United States.112 In 2007, Kenya reportedly ren-
105 ‘Kenyan police arrests five more terror suspects in Mombasa’ Xinhua, 15 November 2012. http://
www.shanghaidaily.com/Article/Article_xinhua.asp?id=107845 on 24 July 2015. See also ‘Rogo’s 
children arrested in raid’, Daily Nation, 14 November 2012. http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Rogos-
children-arrested-in-raid/-/1056/1619702/-/qjv8l6z/-/index.html on 23 July 2015. 
106 MUHURI, We’re tired of  taking you to the Court, 26-34.
107 ‘Terror suspect gunned down in Mombasa’, The Nairobi Star, 17 June 2013. http://www.the-star.
co.ke/news/Article-124521/terror-suspect-gunned-down-mombasa on 25th July 2015.
108 ‘Kenya: Terror Suspect Gunned Down in Mombasa’, The Nairobi Star, 17 June 2013. http://
allafrica.com/stories/201306170999.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_
campaign=-Feed%3A+AllafricaNewsKenya+%28News%3A+Kenya%29 on 23 July 2015. 
 See also, ‘Kenya: Wives of  slain terror suspects charged in Mombasa, Kilifi’ Star, 18 June 2013. http://
allafrica.com/stories/201306181662.html on 28 July 2015.
 See also, ‘Mombasa police arrest wife of  killed terror suspect,’ Coast Week, June 14–20, 2013. http://
www.coastweek.com/3624-mombasa-terror-suspect-arrested.htm on 28 July 2015.
109 ‘Terror suspects killed in Mombasa’, The Nairobi Star, 16 November 2012.
110 ‘Aboud Rogo, Kenya Muslim cleric, shot dead’, Associated Press, 27 August 2012. See also Horowitz 
J, ‘Assassinations, disappearances, and riots: What’s happening in Mombasa?’ Open Society Justice 
Initiative, August 29 2012, www.soros.org/voices/assassinations-disappearances-and-riots-what-s-
happening-mombasa on 27 July 2015. See Task Force on the Investigation into the murder of  Aboud 
Rogo Mohammed, No. 16300 (2012), Kenya Gazette Vol CXIV—No 111, http://www.kenyalaw.org/
klr/index.php?id=1157 on 27 July 2015.
 See Multi-Agency Task Force on the murder of  Aboud Rogo Mohammed and other criminal acts 
that followed the murder of  Aboud Rogo Mohammed, Report on the Murder of  Aboud Rogo Mohammed 
and Other Acts of  Criminalities, August 2013 1–5, 167.
111 Human Rights Watch, ‘Kenya: Set Independent inquiry on Mombasa killing: Police must continue 
to comply with law responding to unrest’, Press Release, August 28, 2012. http://www.hrw.org/
news/2012/08/28/kenya-set-independent-inquiry-mombasa-killing, on 27 July 2015.
112 Amnesty International, Kenya: Unlawful transfer of  ‘terror suspects’ must be investigated. 31 July 2008.
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dered 85 terrorist suspects to Somalia who were thereafter rendered to Ethio-
pia.113 The ATPU in Mombasa was further reported to have arrested terror 
suspect, Mohammed Abdulmalik, and transferring him to US personnel who 
later rendered him to Djibouti, where he was detained in a US military base 
and thereafter rendered to Afghanistan and moved to his current detention at 
Guantanamo Bay.114
v. Excessive Use of Force and Torture 
Several reports of  terrorist suspects being beaten and subjected to forms 
of  violence. In the Northern, North Eastern, and Coastal regions, which have 
large populations of  Somalis and Muslims, the ATPU has been reported to injure 
several while rounding up ‘terrorist suspects.’115
The ATPU has aslo been accused of  actions that amount to torture. The 
ATPU is accused of  using torture and other prohibited means of  investigation to 
extract information from terror suspects. It has further been accused of  render-
ing suspects to jurisdictions where they face a real risk of  torture.116
vi. Disappearances 
The ATPU has further been accused of  being responsible for the disap-
pearance of  terror suspects. Several reports indicate that before the suspects 
disappeared, they had encountered the police.117 Such instances include the 
113 Muslim Human Rights Forum, Horn of  Terror: Report of  US-led mass extra-ordinary renditions from 
Kenya to Somalia, Ethiopia, and Guantanamo Bay, January–June 2007: Presented to the Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights on 6 July 2007. See also, Human Rights Watch, ‘Ethiopia/Kenya: 
Account for Missing Rendition Victims: Secret Detainees Interrogated by US Officials Are Still in 
Custody’, Press Release, 1 October 2008. http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/10/01/ethiopiakenya-
account-missing-rendition-victims on 27 July 2015.
114 Reprieve, Mohamed Abdulmalik, (prisoner profile), at www.reprieve.org.uk/mohammedabdulmalik.
115 Human Rights Watch, ‘Criminal Reprisals: Kenyan Police and Military Abuses against Ethnic 
Somalis’, May 2012. www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0512webwcover.pdf  on 27 July 
2015. See also Human Rights Watch, ‘Kenya: End Police Reprisals in Northern Region: Police Abuse 
Villagers after Attacks on Security Forces’, Press Release, 25 October 2012. http://www.hrw.org/
news/2012/10/25/kenya-end-police-reprisals-northern-region on 28 July 2015. 
116 Open Society Justice Initiative, Counterterrorism and Human Rights Abuses in Kenya and Uganda: The World 
Cup bombing and beyond, November 2012. 
 See also Muslim Human Rights Forum, Horn of  Terror: Report of  US-led Mass Extra-ordinary Renditions 
from Kenya to Somalia, Ethiopia, and Guantanamo Bay, January–June 2007.
117 Human Rights Council, Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Ninety-ninth session post-
sessional document, A/HRC/WGEID/99/1, March 11–15, 2013, para. 16.
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disappearance of  Badru Mramba,118 Sylvester Owino Opiyo, and Jacob Musyo-
ka.119
Vii. The Prevention of Terrorism Act (2012)
In its attempts to fight terrorism, Kenya has enacted a law specific to ter-
rorism. Hon. Mwai Kibaki signed the Prevention of  Terrorism Act into law in 
October 2012.120 Kenya had been under pressure from foreign governments to 
make a law specific to terrorism.121
Critics have warned and argued against this law for the following reasons:
viii. Limitation of Fundamental Rights 
It is argued that Section 35 can be misused by authorities to deny funda-
mental rights as it allows for limitations on specified fundamental rights for the 
purposes of  investigating, detecting, or preventing terrorist acts, and to balance 
opposing fundamental rights.122
ix. Vague Provisions 
The very definition of  terrorism in the Act is vague.123 Additionally, Sec-
tion 2(a) criminalises acts that create a “serious risk to the health or safety of  
the public”, “result in serious damage to property”, or that “prejudices national 
security or public safety”. It does not, however, offer explanations on what may 
constitute such actions. 
118 MUHURI, Interview with male witness, Mombasa, 138. 
 MUHURI, Interview with Rehema Lugogo, November 17, 2012, Mombasa.
 https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/human-rights-abuses-by-kenya-
atpu-20140220.pdf  on 28 July 2015.
119 ‘Lawyers suspect Kenyan police in terror abduction’, Associated Press, 26 May 2012. http://bigstory.
ap.org/content/lawyers-suspect-kenyan-police-terror-abduction on 27 July 2015.
120 ‘Kibaki signs historic Anti- terrorism Bill’, Standard Digital, 14 October 2012. http://www.
standardmedia.co.ke/?ArticleID=2000068354&pageNo=2&story_title on 27 July 2015. 
121 U.S. Department of  State Bureau of  Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, July 
2011, 17. www.state.gov/documents/organization/195768.pdf  on 25 July 2015. 
122 This is subject to the Article 24 derogation clause of  the Constitution.
 See Article 35, Prevention of  Terrorism Act, 2012. 
123 Section 2(b), The Prevention of  Terrorism Act, 2012.
 See argument in the ‘‘terrorism’ defined’ section of  the paper.
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Section 37(2) is also unclear as it exempts the Inspector-General from ap-
plying for an ex parte order from a judge for the police to seize property when “it 
is not reasonably practicable, having regard to the urgency of  the situation” so 
long as he notifies a judge within 72 hours. There is, however, no provision that 
assists in the determination of  an urgent situation.
Moreover, the Inspector-General of  Police is empowered under Section 
3(1) (b) (iii) where reasonable grounds exist, to recommend that the cabinet sec-
retary declare a person, group, or trust a terrorist group and subject it to various 
sanctions. Such a label can easily be given as long as the entity acts “in association 
with” another designated entity. However, a description of  what would be consti-
tuted as done ‘in association with’ a designated entity is lacking.
x. Violation of Freedom of Association and Assembly
Section 24 provides for criminal action against the members of  a group that 
has been designated as terrorist so long as the group has received such designa-
tion. This section does not require that the individuals engage in terrorist act 
themselves but rather criminalises such individual for merely being involved with 
the group. 
Section 25 further criminalizes the organization, facilitation, or assistance 
in organizing or facilitating a meeting where an individual knows or has reason 
to believe the meeting’s purpose is to support the terrorism group or further the 
activities of  the terrorism group. This provision fails to recognise the fact that a 
grouping designated as terrorist may not be carrying on a meeting for a criminal 
purpose and thus risks punishing people for playing a role in organising a meet-
ing that was not criminal.
Neither of  these provisions necessitates that the requirements of  Article 24 
of  the Constitution, read together with Article 22 of  the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)124 and Article 11 of  the African Charter on Human 
People’s Rights (ACHPR),125 be proved. These provisions require that limitations 
on fundamental rights be allowable only when provided by law, justifiable in a 
democratic society and when they serve a legitimate aim.
124 On restrictions of  the right to freedom of  association.
 Article 22, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368.
125 On restrictions of  the right to freedom of  assembly.
 Article 11, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
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xi. Protection of the Rights of Arrested Persons and Detainees
Section 32(10) of  the Act, however, conflicts with Article 49 and 50126 of  
the Constitution. It empowers a court to extend an individual’s detention in po-
lice custody for purposes of  investigation for up to 30 days upon an application 
from the police, and that a judge can continue to extend the detention for a fur-
ther period of  up to a total of  90 days. 
Section 33 of  the Act requires that before the application described by the 
provision of  32(10) is granted, the police officer must specify the offense and 
describe the evidence available. This further allows the individual to be detained 
for longer periods pending the investigation. This leads to detention that is un-
lawfully prolonged.
The right to fair administrative action as protected by the Bill of  Rights in 
Article 47 of  the Constitution is further at risk of  violation due to section 3 of  
the Act, which provides for designation as a terrorist. This section allows the 
Cabinet Secretary, upon recommendation by the Inspector-General, to designate 
a person, group or trust as a terrorist group and subject it to various sanctions 
where ‘reasonable grounds exist.’ This lowers the threshold for criminal offences, 
which is ‘beyond reasonable doubt.’127
Section 3(7) of  the Act, which provides that the High Court may also ex-
clude the applicant and his or her counsel from accessing evidence upon which 
the court relies, further violates the right to a fair hearing. This violates the re-
quirement that the accused should have recourse to view the evidence brought 
upon him and to contest the allegations and evidence submitted by the prosecu-
tion. This further results in a denial of  the accused person’s right to respond.
Section 3(8) (a-b) of  the Act allows the court to receive and consider any 
information it determines relevant. This provision does not prevent the govern-
ment from presenting evidence obtained through torture or other interrogation 
means that are prohibited by international law.128
126 On the rights of  arrested or detained persons.
127 Wilkinson S, ‘Standards of  Proof  in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Fact-Finding 
and Inquiry Missions’, Geneva Academy of  International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights’, 
2011, 24. http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/Standards%20of%20proo%20report.pdf  on 27 
July 2015. 
128 Article 15, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M 1027. 
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xii. Removal of the requirement to prove intent 
Section 46 empowers the Cabinet Secretary to refuse or revoke the registra-
tion of  a company or association when they believe that such company or asso-
ciation has made available, or is likely to make available, directly or indirectly, any 
resources in support of  a terrorist group. The absence of  a requirement to show 
proof  of  wrongdoing enables the punishment of  offenders despite such offend-
ers not intentionally making available resources in support of  a terrorist group.
The absence of  an explicit requirement of  the designated entity to have 
known it was committing, preparing, or attempting to commit a terrorist act or 
associating with a designated entity129 further risks abuse where a company or 
association may be designated as terrorist despite lacking such intent so long as 
it acted in association with a designated entity. Furthermore, there is no defence 
should the association prove lack of  knowledge of  the associated entity’s desig-
nation as terrorist.
xiii. The Security Laws (Amendment) Act
On December 18 2014, Parliament had in a special sitting to deliberate on 
one of  the more controversial bills tabled before it in recent years,130 the Secu-
rity Laws (Amendment Bill). The President signed the bill into law days later, 
on December 19 2015. Several parts of  the Bill (as it then was) were criticised. 
The process through which the bill was introduced was itself  criticised for being 
hasty.131 The process was also against public participation since it was published 
on December 10 2014 and was not made immediately accessible before it was de-
bated.132 According to reports, the speaker of  the National Assembly, Justin Mu-
turi, insisted that MPs vote and adopt the amendments on that day at all cost.133
129 Article 3, Prevention of  Terrorism Act, 2012. 
130 FIDH, ‘Kenya: The Security Laws (Amendment) Act must be repealed’, 19 December 2014.
 The debate created a rift between the Opposition Members of  Parliament (MPs) and the Jubilee 
MPs. The speaker adjourned the debate twice and in the third sitting that afternoon, there was 
absolute chaos with MPs insulting and assaulting each other.
131 Human Rights Watch, ‘Kenya: Security Bill tramples basic rights. Lawmakers should reject 
amendments’, 13 December 2015.
132 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Advisory on The Security Laws (Amendment) Bill, 
2014.
133 FIDH, ‘Kenya: The Security Laws (Amendment) Act must be repealed’, 19 December 2014.
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xiv. Freedom of Expression and the Media
Clause 12 was in violation of  Articles 33 & 34 of  the Constitution. It penal-
ized media coverage likely to incite violence, cause public alarm, and undermine 
investigations or security operations. The maximum sentence was three years in 
prison, a Kshs. 5 million fine or both. Clauses 15, 72 and 73 were in violation 
of  Articles 34(2) and 35, which prohibit(s) state control of  the media. It sought 
to amend the Penal Code to create the offence of  publishing or causing to be 
published or distributed obscene, gory or offensive material likely to cause fear 
and alarm to the public or disturb public peace.
xv. Arbitrary Detention
Clause 18 (4) (c) and (10) violated Article 49 (g), and 25 (a) and (c) which 
provides for the right to be charged, not to be subjected to torture, cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment; and the right to a fair trial. The 
clauses made it possible for persons to be held without charge for a period of  up 
to 90 days. This provision allows for detention without trial as a person is merely 
produced in court but not charged. 
Clause 77 further removed the necessity of  the police to inform the court 
why suspects are being held longer, from 90 days to 360 days.
xvi. Fair Trial
Clause 19 violates Article 49 (d), (f), (i), (j), (l) and Article 50 on the right 
to a fair trial. It enables the prosecution to withhold information and witnesses 
from an accused person and forces the accused person to incriminate himself  or 
herself  by sharing their information and witnesses. 
xvii. Right to Privacy
 Clause 66 eliminated the need for the National Intelligence Service (NIS) 
to seek a warrant from court meaning that the officers are able to carry out their 
functions without due regard to the law and respect for human rights, contrary 
to Article 238. It also suspends the role of  the judiciary to ensure protection of  
privacy.
xviii. Security of Tenure and Independence of the National Security Organs
Clauses 63, 64 and 98 sought to remove the security of  tenure of  the Di-
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rector General of  the National Intelligence Service and the Inspector General 
of  the National Police Service. This violates Chapter 14 with the Executive sus-
pending the powers of  the people and Parliament that ensures accountability and 
oversight
xix. Fair Administrative Action
Clause 31 empowered the Director of  Registration to take away citizenship 
rights through withdrawal of  identity cards. It expands the grounds provided for 
under the Constitution by including a vague and indefinable ground ‘any other 
justifiable cause. The person whose identity card has been revoked by the Direc-
tor has no recourse for redress and this violates Article 47 to fair administrative 
action. This section would lead to discrimination.
xx. The Courts 
The court’s case law has been indicative of  the desire to protect human 
rights even when dealing with terrorist suspects. The courts found that the 
ATPU’s actions have amounted to torture through the unlawful detentions and 
renditions,134 and held the extraordinary renditions by the ATPU to be illegal.135
In Petition Nos 628 & 630 of  2014(Consolidated),136 High Court Judge 
George Odunga ordered the suspension of  eight clauses of  the Security Laws 
(Amendment) Act because they were unconstitutional. He further urged that the 
provisions of  Section 30A and 30F of  the Prevention of  Terrorism Act be inter-
rogated before implementation because they may prima facie infringe upon the 
constitutional freedoms and fundamental rights.137
xxi. Human Rights Legislations
Kenya enacted the Constitution of  Kenya 2010, the National Police Ser-
vice Act138 and the Independent Policing Oversight Act.139 These new legislations 
134 Salim Awadh Salim and 10 Others v. Commissioner of  Police and three others, High Court at Nairobi, Petition 
No. 822 of  2008, 31 July 2013.
135 Zuhura Suleiman v. Commissioner of  Police and three others, High Court at Nairobi, Miscellaneous 
Application 441 of  2010, 30 September 2010.
 Mohamed Aktar Kana v. Attorney General, High Court at Nairobi, Constitutional Application 544 of  
2010.
136 Coalition for Reform and another v Republic of  Kenya and another [2015] eKLR. 
137 Coalition for Reform and another v Republic of  Kenya and another [2015] eKLR, para 185.
138 National Police Service Act, (Act No. 11A of  2011).
139 Independent Policing Oversight, (Act No. 35 of  2011).
Brian Kimari
216 Strathmore Law Review, January 2016
have provisions meant to protect the human rights of  people and to restrain the 
exercise of  arbitrary powers by the police. The new Constitution provides for a 
Bill of  Rights, which is meant to protect human rights. Criticism has, however, 
been levelled against the government since several violations have occurred even 
when these provisions have been in force.
xxii. Oversight Authorities 
The creation of  the National Police Service Commission, the Internal Af-
fairs Unit, and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority are among the re-
forms taken which are capable of  improving the situation. Through these and 
the enacted legislation, there are provisions for internal police accountability, in-
dependent oversight, police vetting and the compensation of  victims of  police 
abuses.
X. Conclusion
Viewed as a form of  imperialism, it becomes clear that terrorism is not a 
novel problem. Terrorism has existed for long and manifestations of  it through 
imperialism have been documented for time immemorial. Arguments that terror-
ism requires the suspension of  normal rules are thus unfounded.
This paper has further shown the importance of  the rule of  law when deal-
ing with terrorism. The rule of  law serves the interests of  the government. It is 
important to preserve the Kenyan democracy that is envisioned in the Constitu-
tion. Furthermore, respect for the rule of  law is important in the fight against 
terrorism as it may delay violence and allow Kenya to gain support in the fight 
against terrorism since it shows there is respect for human rights. This goes a 
long way to end the menace through a joint effort to fight terrorism. 
Kenya should thus refrain from such violations of  the normal rules when 
dealing with terrorism. As it is, the Kenyan government has taken up question-
able counter-terrorism measures. Some of  the actions of  its security agencies 
have been criticised by human rights’ NGOs and the media worldwide. Some of  
the laws that Kenya has passed, in relation to terrorism, further allow for several 
violations of  human rights and empower security agents to violate the rights of  
others without consequences.
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In the words of  Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of  State, 
‘Terrorism is a criminal act and should be treated accordingly–and that means applying 
the rule of  law fairly and consistently. We have found, through experience around the 
world, that the best way to defeat terrorist threats is to increase law enforcement capa-
bilities while at the same time promoting democracy and human rights....’140
XI. Recommendations
The Kenyan Government should strive to act within the bounds of  the 
rule of  law, and protect the rights of  terrorist suspects, and convicted terrorists. 
Having identified the eight precepts of  the rule of  law as proposed by Bingham, 
recommendations to the Kenyan government should act in line with the provi-
sions of  these precepts.
i. The Law Must Be Accessible and Intelligible
The government should ensure that no laws in relation to terrorism are in 
conflict and these laws should not be in contravention with the Constitution. The 
government should remove the provisions of  the Prevention of  Terrorism Act 
that are found to contradict the Constitution.141 Contradiction in the laws does 
not allow for intelligibility. Otherwise one does not know what to expect from 
his actions.
ii. Disputes Must Be Solved by Application of the Law Rather than 
Exercise of Discretion
The government should ensure that the police and the ATPU do not carry 
out extrajudicial killings; torture and other ill-treatment; excessive use of  force; 
disappearances; or other forms of  arbitrary detention, renditions, and transfers 
to torture and other serious human rights violations. 
The ATPU’s conduct should be scrutinised by Independent Policing Over-
sight Authority (IPOA) and the National Police Service Commission (NPSC) 
to ensure that they act in compliance with the law and further ensure that any 
discretionary exercise of  power is punished.
140 Secretary of  State Madeleine Albright, Speech at University of  World Economy and Diplomacy, 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan (April 17 2000). htttp://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000417.
html. on 17 September 2015.
141 In line with Article 2(4), Constitution of  Kenya, 2010.
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iii. The law Must Apply Equally to All
The Prevention of  Terrorism Act and any other provision for handling ter-
rorist suspects should not apply differently for citizens and aliens. Aliens should 
be allowed similar rights to citizens in the same position.
All terrorist suspects should be afforded the right to habeas corpus regard-
less of  their origin. 
The provision of  Section 32 of  the Prevention of  Terrorism Act should be 
removed since it allows the police to hold terrorist suspects over long periods.
iv. The Law Must Protect Fundamental Human Rights
The ATPU should act in accordance with the human rights provided in 
the Bill of  Rights as enshrined in the Constitution. In particular, they should not 
engage in actions such as unlawful killing and torture which are prohibited in the 
Constitution.
Independent investigations should be conducted into the accusations that 
ATPU members have played a role in extrajudicial killings, torture and other ill-
treatment. The ATPU should further be compelled to give such information as 
shall be required by the IPOA in carrying out investigations.
Parliament should enact laws that are explicit in the protection of  human 
rights and that criminalize the contravention of  human rights. This is in contrast 
to the Prevention of  Terrorism Act, which did not explicitly prevent the govern-
ment from adducing evidence obtained by torture.
The government should negotiate for the lawful return of  terrorism sus-
pects who have been rendered to other jurisdictions. 
v. Disputes Must Be Solved without Prohibitive Cost or Inordinate 
Delay 
The courts should not allow for the prolonged detention of  terrorist sus-
pects. Such detention costs the government a lot of  money in the upkeep of  
prisoners, and further allows the suspects to be detained for long periods despite 
no evidence showing that they are guilty of  the offences they are accused of.
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vi.	 Public	Officials	Must	Use	Power	Reasonably	and	Not	Exceed	their	
Powers
The government should strengthen the Internal Affairs Unit, the NPSC 
and the IPOA to enable them ensure that the ATPU and other police officers act 
intra vires and without unnecessary discretion, and to account for their actions.
The DPP should bring criminal charges against ATPU officers should there 
be grounds to suspect that an officer committed a human rights abuse, including 
extrajudicial killings, torture and other ill-treatment, excessive use of  force, and 
disappearances of  persons as well as other forms of  arbitrary detention, unlawful 
renditions, and transfers to locations where suspects will be tortured, or other 
serious human rights violations.
vii. The System for Resolving Differences Must be Fair 
The courts should be fair and should waive provisions that allow the courts 
to forgo the terrorist suspect’s right to a fair hearing. The prosecution and the 
terrorist suspect should have equal opportunities to state their case.
viii. The State Must Comply with its International Law Obligations
Parliament should ratify more international instruments that recognise and 
protect more human rights. For instance, Parliament should consider ratifying 
the International Convention for the Protection of  All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance and make the act of  an “enforced disappearance” an offense un-
der Kenyan criminal law. The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment, which 
requires states’ parties to set up, designate or maintain at the domestic level one 
or several visiting bodies for the prevention of  torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading forms of  treatment or punishment.
Finally, it is critical that these laws be enforced. No change would result 
purely from well-written laws if  these laws were not properly enforced. Enforce-
ment requires respect for these laws by governments and individuals and, further, 
it requires the enforcement bodies and mechanisms to be checked and balanced.
